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A commonly-discussed feature of perceptual experience is that it has ‘assertoric’ or 
‘phenomenal’ force. We will start by discussing various descriptions of the assertoricity of 
perceptual experience. We will then adopt a minimal characterization of assertoricity: a 
perceptual experience has assertoric force just in case it inclines the perceiver to believe its 
content. Adducing cases that show that visual experience is not always assertoric, we will argue 
that what renders these visual experiences non-assertoric is that they are penetrated by belief-like 
imaginings. Lastly, we will explain why it is that when belief-like imaginings—as opposed to 
beliefs (and other cognitive states)—penetrate visual experience, they render visual experiences 
non-assertoric. 
 
1. Perceptual Assertoricity 
 
Perceptual experiences are usually claimed to have ‘assertoric’ or ‘phenomenal’ force. One way 
to elucidate this feature is to say that perceptual experience purports to reveal what the world is 




There seems to be an aspect of the phenomenal character of perceptual experience that is 
distinct from the phenomenal character of imagery, episodes of wondering, and pangs of 
desire. ... Our perceptual experience [of a black dot] purports to reveal how the world is, 
whereas visualizing the dot, wondering whether there is such a black dot in front of you, or 
feeling a pang of desire for a black dot does not. Phenomenal force is analogous to assertoric 
force, in its role for the speaker. Making an assertion is a way to express how you believe 
things to be. Similarly, perceptual experience is a way to take in how things seem to you to 
be. Phenomenal force is analogous to assertoric force to the extent that both attach to belief-
like states. (790-1) 
 
Similarly, Matthen (2005) maintains that “visual states produced by looking have an implied 
assertion operator—they convey to us an act of sensory classification performed by the visual 
system on an object that is present” (306). The idea is that the visual experience of, say, a red 
tomato, has the intrinsic phenomenal property of ‘asserting’ that there is a red tomato in front of 
the perceiver. Other mental states, e.g., desires, imaginings, speculations, etc., are non-assertoric: 
they do not purport to inform us—at least not directly—about the world; they have no “implied 
assertion operator.” 
Although the assertoricity of perceptual experience is deemed to be phenomenal, it should 
not be confused with the sensory phenomenology of experience (i.e., the phenomenological 
aspects of perceptual experience that, on representationalist views of perception, supervene on 
experience’s representational content). Assertoricity is taken to be constitutive of perceptual 
experience, but not to follow from, or be intrinsically related to, its sensory aspects. The 
phenomenality of perceptual assertoricity is commonly described in psychological terms: 
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perceptual experiences are described as accompanied by ‘feelings of assurance’ that they 
represent the world faithfully, as having ‘the feel of truth,’ as ‘forcing themselves upon us as 
being true,’ etc. (see Teng 2018, 641ff). 
Perceptual assertoricity is invoked in at least two philosophical contexts. One context is that 
of representationalist or doxastic views of perception. Such views often maintain that 
experiences not only have representational content, but also ‘assert’ that their content is true, just 
as beliefs ‘assert’ that their content is true. Martin (2002, 386-7), for instance, distinguishes 
between two kinds of mental representation, stative and semantic. Stative representation is a 
narrow category, encompassing only representations that ‘state’ that their content is true: beliefs, 
judgments, and—on representationalist accounts of perception—perceptual experiences. 
Semantic representation is broader, also covering mental representations that do not ‘state’ that 
their content is true: desires, hopes, speculations, etc. 
Gluer (2009, 306ff) too distinguishes two kinds of mental representations: strong and weak. 
Both have representational content, but only strong representations have assertoric force, i.e., 
represent the world as being such as to render this content true. Gluer notes that assertoricity 
ensues from a representational state’s having a mind-to-world direction of fit. On Gluer’s view, 
perceptual experiences, which—like beliefs and judgments—have this direction of fit, are strong 
representations. Weak representations, by contrast, have either a world-to-mind direction of fit 
(e.g., desires), or the “null direction of fit” (e.g., imaginings and speculations), and hence lack 
assertoric force (2009, note 16). 
A related context in which perceptual assertoricity is invoked is that of the justificatory 
status of perceptual experience. ‘Dogmatists’ contend that a perceptual experience with content p 
provides an immediate, i.e., non-inferential, justification for believing that p. The tenability of 
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immediate justification is sometimes explained by the fact that perceptual experience has 
assertoric or phenomenal force. Teng (2018) notes that dogmatists ascribe phenomenal force to 
perceptual experience, but not beliefs and judgments, since the latter do not provide immediate 
justification. Siegel and Silins (2015) similarly explain that for dogmatists, the “phenomenal 
force of experiences make[s] them belief-like enough to justify [beliefs] because they assertively 
represent propositions, but they are not belief-like enough to require justification themselves” 
(792). 
The questions of whether the assertoric force of perceptual experiences establishes the 
tenability of non-inferential justification, and whether this force is like the assertoric force of 
beliefs, are not relevant to our argument. This paper adopts a minimal characterization of 
perceptual assertoricity, taking it to be the property of inclining the perceiver to believe what her 
experience says about the world. This characterization is consistent with the aforementioned 
psychological characterizations of assertoricity (‘feeling of assurance,’ etc.). We will likewise 
assume that an assertoric experience induces the perceiving subject to invoke it in justifying her 
beliefs, whether or not that justification is immediate.1 Those who maintain that perceptual 
experience does not provide immediate justification should be willing to accept the minimal 
characterization of perceptual assertoricity as the property of inclining the perceiver to believe 
the content of her experience. Note that our assumption is not that perceptual assertoricity is a 
 
1 An anonymous referee noted that as infants and non-human animals do not engage in reasoning 
and justifying, they cannot be induced by perceptual experience to invoke that experience in 
justifying beliefs. We accept this claim. The inclination in question manifests itself in reasoning 
and justifying only in subjects who can carry out these acts; in infants, etc., it seems that, as long 
as the experience persists, the inclination directly generates a belief with the experienced content. 
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contingent causal relation between perceptual experience and belief: rather, the inclination in 
question is assumed to be constitutive of perceptual experience, reflecting the role of perceptual 
experience in revealing what the world is like. 
Like any characterization of perceptual assertoricity, our characterization is compatible with 
the fact that a perceiver, despite being inclined to believe the content of her experience, may 
wind up not believing it. Having evidence against the content of her experience, she may resist 
the inclination, and not believe that content. Can strong defeating evidence alone thwart the 
purported inclination to believe? We address this question below. 
This paper argues that although perceptual experience is assertoric in many cases, it is not 
always assertoric: sometimes we are not inclined by a perceptual experience to believe what it 
says about the world, and do not take it to justify that belief. 
One further note is in order. Although our argument can be adapted to fit any theory of 
perception (specifically, various forms of disjunctivism and naïve realism), for convenience it 
will be formulated in representationalist terms. We will assume that visual experiences are 
representational states, i.e., that they have content, the form of which is propositional. 
Experiences are thus either veridical or non-veridical by virtue of satisfying or failing to satisfy 
correctness conditions. (Disparities between different versions of these representationalist 
assumptions are unimportant here). 
 
2. Non-Assertoric Experiences 
 




Case A: Mary perceives a distant object as looking like a wheel lying on the ground: her 
visual experience represents the object as circular and slanted (experience A1). Recalling, 
from past experience, that the distant object is not a wheel, but a standing elliptical boulder, 
Mary’s experience adjusts, and represents the object correctly, namely, as an elliptical 
boulder (experience A2). Toying with the idea that the elliptical boulder looks like an 
abandoned wheel, Mary reverts to the non-veridical experience of a circular wheel 
(experience A3). 
 
We will initially claim (though we will soon refine this claim) that whereas A1, and, obviously, 
A2, are assertoric, A3, despite being identical to A1 in content and sensory phenomenology, is 
non-assertoric: it does not generate an inclination to believe its content. 
 
Case B: looking in the mirror, John visually experiences a spot on his nose (experience B1). 
Moving his head, John’s visual experience shifts, representing the spot as being on the 
mirror, not on his nose (experience B2). Yet amused by the fact that the spot looked like it 
was on his nose, John moves his head back, so as to revert to the non-veridical visual 
experience of the spot as being on his nose (experience B3). 
 
Here too, we will initially claim that whereas B3 is identical to B1 in sensory phenomenology 
and content, it is non-assertoric: it does not incline John to believe its content; a refined version 
of this claim will be endorsed below. 
Similar cases abound. E.g., knowing that she is looking at a shaded white object, Mary may 
nevertheless deliberately ‘shift’ from experiencing a shaded white object to experiencing a grey 
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object. Under certain conditions, the latter experience will be non-assertoric: Mary will not be 
inclined to believe that the object is grey. Looking in the mirror, John can pretend that he is 
observing his doppelgänger, and have an experience with different content (e.g., different 
objects, left-right relations, etc.); this experience, too, will be non-assertoric. Further cases of 
perceptual non-assertoricity will be adduced below. A specific type of non-assertoric 
experiences, including experiences we sometimes have in watching ‘visual fictions’—plays, 
movies, etc.—will be analyzed in the next section. We will argue that experiences like A3 and 
B3 are non-assertoric for the same reason the ‘visual fiction’ experiences are non-assertoric. For 
convenience, we will focus on case B, but our discussion also applies to case A and other 
garden-variety examples of non-assertoricity. 
Despite the temporal discontinuity between B1 and B3 (A1 and A3, etc.), these experiences 
are identical in important respects: not only are the sensory phenomenology and representational 
content of these experiences identical, but the perspectives, viewing conditions, and sensory 
stimuli associated with B1 and B3 are also identical. The crucial difference between the initial 
experience and the ‘reverted-to’ experience pertains to assertoricity: B1 generates an inclination 
to believe its content, whereas B3 does not. Since there is no ‘external’ explanation of this 
difference (given that the perspectives, viewing conditions, etc., are identical), to account for the 
non-assertoricity of B3, reference must be made to an ‘internal’ influence. B3’s non-
assertoricity, we will argue, arises from its penetration by belief-like imaginings. 
It might be claimed that, contra our contention, B3 is assertoric. Why not say that B3 
inclines John to believe that the spot is on his nose? It might be argued that though we are free to 
stipulate that in reverting to experiencing the spot as being on his nose, John’s intention is to 
pretend or to amuse himself—this is, indeed, how we described the case—nevertheless, once 
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John has B3, he is inclined, despite his intention to pretend, be amused, etc., to believe that the 
spot is on his nose. For in principle, every perceptual experience is assertoric. 
This objection raises the more general question of how the putative inclination to believe 
manifests itself. A plausible answer is that it manifests itself in the subject’s mental acts, 
specifically, her engaging in reasoning and justifying her beliefs. That is, if perceptual 
experience generates an inclination to believe, that experience must play some justificatory role 
(assuming that the subject is capable of reasoning and justification; see note 1). Even when, due 
to defeating evidence, the subject does not end up believing the content of her experience, while 
she is having the experience, the inclination to believe reveals itself in the subject’s doubts 
regarding the objects she is looking at. In other words, the inclination generates epistemic 
‘tension’ between an experience and one’s beliefs about the experienced objects. 
We do not deny that such tension between beliefs and experiences sometimes arises. Our 
claim is that it does not arise in the case of John’s spot, and hence, given that the inclination in 
question manifests itself epistemically, B3 is non-assertoric. More precisely, John does not 
examine whether B3 is veridical, and does not consciously consider it in reasoning about what 
the world is like; he is just amused by B3. To see the difference between B3 and experiences that 
generate epistemic tension, compare B3 to experiencing visual illusions such as the Muller-Lyer 
illusion, Shepard’s tables, trompe-l’oeil, etc. Even someone who is familiar with the Muller-Lyer 
illusion, and concerned about correctly judging whether the lines are equally long, will be 
inclined to believe the content of her experience, i.e., to believe that the lines aren’t equal. This 
inclination manifests itself in doubt about whether the lines are indeed equal. Familiarity with the 
illusion doesn’t suffice to alleviate the doubt: the viewer may keep scrutinizing the lines, 
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wondering whether she has focused sufficiently on the intersections between the lines and the 
arrows, whether the lines were drawn accurately, etc. 
To further clarify this, let us adduce a different sort of example. Suppose that, having robust 
evidence that her honorable friend Jim is abroad, Maggie visually experiences someone who 
looks very much like Jim stealing a book from the library.2 Maggie might respond to her 
experience in two different ways. On one scenario, her visual experience generates epistemic 
tension: despite having evidence that Jim is honorable, that he is abroad, etc., Maggie keeps 
wondering whether the thief she sees is Jim, whether she is wrong to believe that Jim is 
honorable, etc. Maggie may continue to believe that Jim is not the thief, but be unable to shake 
off the doubt generated by her experience. On this scenario, Maggie’s experience is assertoric: 
despite the defeating evidence, her experience inclines her to believe that Jim is the thief. 
On the second scenario, Maggie’s experience does not generate epistemic tension. Having 
the same evidence to the effect that Jim is honorable, that he is abroad, and so on, Maggie is 
merely amused by her experience, pretending that she observes Jim stealing a book. Believing 
that the thief is not Jim, she might likewise engage in counterfactual speculation, in response to 
this experience, about how bizarre it would be to see Jim stealing a book. Maggie’s experience, 
on this scenario, raises no doubts about Jim’s (real-world) character. She does not believe, nor is 
 
2 On views according to which singular objects are represented in perceptual experience, and 
represented objects are determined ‘internally’ (see, e.g., Siegel 2010, 5-6), Maggie experiences 
Jim. On other views, Maggie experiences a set of properties associated with recognizing Jim. 
Regardless of whether perceptual content is taken to be singular, this example illustrates the 
difference between cases where the visual experience generates epistemic tension, and cases 
where it doesn’t. 
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she inclined to believe, that the thief is Jim: there is no tension between her experience and her 
beliefs. 
Like Maggie’s second-scenario experience, there is no tension between B3 and John’s belief 
that he does not have a spot on his nose. In this respect, B3 differs from Maggie’s first-scenario 
experience, as well as from visual experiences arising from visual illusions such as trompe-l'oeil. 
John is only toying with the idea that he has a spot on his nose, enjoying his act of pretense. He 
may speculate about whether—in a world in which he has a spot on his nose—his career as a 
newscaster would be affected. But he experiences no epistemic tension. This is also true of the 
other non-assertoric experiences mentioned above. A subject who pretends, while looking in the 
mirror, that she is looking at her doppelgänger, may experience a different object, different left-
right relations, etc. Usually, this experience will not generate any tension with her belief that 
there isn’t really a doppelgänger there. She will mainly be amused by her experience, without 
being inclined to believe its content. 
Note further that, with respect to assertoricity, B3 (as well as the other non-assertoric 
experiences) is similar to mental images conjured up in visualizing. That is, although the non-
assertoric experiences in question may be triggered by external stimuli, their relevance (or lack 
thereof) to reasoning about what the objects being viewed are really like is similar to the 
relevance of mental imagery that arises in visualizations to reasoning about the real-world 
objects being viewed. In this context, it is edifying to invoke Perky effects. In the experiment 
described in Perky (1910), participants looked at an image of, say, a banana, projected onto a 
screen, but believed—in light of their intention to visualize a banana, in line with the instructions 
they had received—that they were only visualizing a banana. The participants reported that they 
were merely visualizing, and denied that they were perceptually experiencing anything. This 
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experiment is often interpreted as showing that the participants’ (veridical) visual experience was 
non-assertoric: it did not incline them to believe that there was something yellow in front of 
them, allegedly because they believed that they were only visualizing a banana (Ghijsen 2014, 
1557ff; Siegel and Silins 2015, 791; Teng 2018, 644ff). Although the structure of B3 differs 
from the structure of the (veridical) Perky perceptual experiences, these experiences demonstrate 
that under certain conditions, the inclination to believe the content of an experience can be 
thwarted, and there is no epistemic tension between experience and belief. These conditions, we 
will argue, include the penetration of perceptual experiences by belief-like imaginings, which 
also explains why the Perky experiences are non-assertoric. 
If B3 does not generate epistemic tension, it is difficult to see in what sense it is assertoric, 
as the objection under discussion contends. This objection may be premised on the assumption 
that defeating evidence cannot block perceptual assertoricity, and hence B3 cannot be rendered 
non-assertoric solely by John’s having robust evidence against it. We are willing to accept this 
assumption: we do not claim that having evidence against the content of a perceptual experience 
thwarts the inclination to believe that content. As demonstrated by the aforementioned visual 
illusions, the ‘Jim-like book thief’ experience (on the first scenario), and similar cases, 
perceptual experience can incline one to believe its content, even if one has robust evidence 
against that content. What can thwart assertoricity, we argue, is engaging in imagining. It is 
therefore important to bear in mind that the experiences we describe as non-assertoric do not 
arise, or do not only arise, when the subject has defeating evidence; they arise in the context of 
pretending, amusing oneself, pondering counterfactuals, etc. 
A different objection to our claim that B3 is non-assertoric denies that the inclination in 
question manifests itself epistemically or consciously. Though John does not (consciously) 
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occupy himself with examining whether B3 is veridical, and is merely amused by it, he may 
nonetheless have some slight, perhaps non-conscious, inclination to believe that he has a spot on 
his nose—an inclination too slight to make him ponder whether there really is a spot on his nose. 
On this objection, while we are free to stipulate that, in pretending that he observes a spot on his 
nose, John does not consciously invoke B3 to justify a belief regarding the presence of a spot on 
his nose, it cannot be the case that B3 does not incline him in the slightest to believe that there is 
a spot on his nose; it must incline him, at least minimally, to hold that belief. Moreover, it seems 
plausible that the purported inclination to believe is a gradational property rather than a binary 
one. If the inclination to believe has gradations, then instead of describing B3 as fully non-
assertoric, B3 should be described, according to this objection, as generating a low degree of 
inclination to believe—a degree too slight to engender conscious epistemic tension. 
This objection is somewhat problematic, as it doesn’t provide a criterion that can determine 
whether a perceptual experience inclines one, to any degree, to believe its content. What feature, 
for instance, can determine that the participants in Perky’s experiment were not inclined by their 
(veridical) experiences, non-consciously or to a slight degree, to believe that there was a real 
yellow image in front of them? Why not say that visualizations in general incline one to believe 
their content? How can such conjectures be refuted, if we deny that the inclination in question 
manifests itself epistemically? Arguing that perceptual experience is always assertoric to some 
degree, and therefore that B3, the doppelgänger-in-the-mirror experience, the Perky experiences, 
etc., generate some inclination to believe, seems like begging the question. 
Nevertheless. to address the second objection, let us suppose that there is such a criterion, or 
there is other reason to maintain that inclinations to believe can arise without being manifested in 
conscious epistemic tensions. Adapting our argument to accord with the assumption that the 
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inclination to believe is a matter of degree, we can refine our claim and assume that B3 generates 
a minimal or non-conscious inclination to believe. Despite these moves, however, the main 
question stands, since the fact that B3’s assertoricity is slight remains in need of explanation. For 
in other cases, as we showed, a subject may be strongly inclined, despite having defeating 
evidence, to believe what her experience tells her. Why is it the case that in some instances we 
are strongly inclined to believe the content of our perceptual experience, and in other instances, 
we are only slightly inclined to believe it? What explains the difference? We propose that, at 
least in the cases in question, the explanatory factor is belief-like imagining: penetration by 
belief-like imaginings may reduce, if not completely block, an experience’s assertoric force. 
 
3. Imaginative Penetration 
 
Our proposed explanation highlights the fact that, in the cases in question, the subjects engage in 
some kind of pretending or make-believe. John, for instance, engaged in imaginings to the effect 
that he experienced the spot as being on his nose. This proposed explanation is based on 
Walton’s account of visual fictions (Walton 1990, ch. 8; 2008, chs. 7-9), which invokes 
imaginative penetration to account for the (non-veridical) perceptual experiences one ordinarily 
has in watching plays, looking at pictures, etc. Our claim is that Walton’s thesis that imaginings 
can penetrate perceptual experience explains perceptual non-assertoricity. 
The imaginings our explanation invokes, as per Walton’s theory, are propositional, 
‘attitudinal’ imaginings. They usually arise in reading or watching works of fiction, playing 
games of make-believe, daydreaming, etc. They may also be conjured up, spontaneously or 
deliberatively, without any connection to these contexts: we may simply intend to imagine, or 
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find ourselves imagining, various propositions. Setting aside divergences between different 
accounts of propositional imaginings, it is widely accepted that these imaginings are belief-like 
in that they are related to other kinds of mental states (e.g., conative or desire-like states, 
emotional responses, motivations, etc.) in a manner akin to that in which beliefs are related to 
those, or similar, states.3 For instance, a child pretending that the neighbor across the street is a 
monster may, when she sees the neighbor approaching, imagine that a monster is approaching, 
and thus may have a fear-like emotion, or be in a desire-like state, ‘wishing’ that the monster 
would go away, etc. Our claim is that propositional imaginings also resemble beliefs in being 
able to penetrate perceptual experience. 
Although propositional, belief-like imaginings may be accompanied by mental images 
(sometimes called ‘sensory’ or ‘imagistic’ imaginings), they should not be identified with such 
images. Some argue that belief-like imaginings and mental images need not arise together. 
Walton (1990, 13), e.g., maintains that “imagining can occur without imagery”; Van Leeuwen 
(2013, 222) similarly claims that “attitude imaginings needn’t have an imagistic representational 
format”: e.g., imagining that elves live forever has no imagistic structure.4 Even those who hold 
that imaginings must have an imagistic component (e.g., Peacocke 1985; Kind 2001) accept that 
the content of propositional imaginings is not fully determined by images. 
 
3 That attitudinal imaginings function like beliefs in certain respects, and differ from mental 
images, is widely accepted in the literature on imaginings. See, e.g., Currie and Ravenscroft 
(2002), Doggett and Egan (2007; 2012), Gendler (2003; 2013), Kind (2013; 2016), Langland-
Hassan (2012), Liao and Doggett (2014), Nichols (2004; 2006a; 2006b), Nichols and Stich 
(2003), Schellenberg (2013), Van Leeuwen (2011), Walton (1990; 2008; 2015). 
4 See also Kind (2016, 5-7); Schellenberg (2013, 499). 
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Whatever the relation between mental images and belief-like imaginings, we will invoke the 
latter to explain non-assertoricity. It is doubtful whether mental imagery can account for 
perceptual non-assertoricity, since mental images also arise in assertoric contexts, e.g., in 
recollection,5 and hence do not, in themselves, seem capable of blocking perceptual assertoricity. 
As will be explained in §4, attitudinal, belief-like imaginings are, by contrast, able to block 
assertoricity. We will also argue that when mental images arise in the context of non-assertoric 
experience, the non-assertoricity does not ensue from these images, but from belief-like 
imaginings that accompany them. 
Cognitive states are claimed to penetrate perceptual experience in various ways (see, e.g., 
Siegel and Silins 2015, 803ff; Deroy 2015, 765ff). We will assume that cognitive penetration 
occurs, without discussing specific modes and mechanisms of penetration. Focusing on the 
penetration of perceptual experience by propositional, belief-like imaginings, we contend that 
just as beliefs can penetrate perceptual experience, so too belief-like imaginings, to a great extent, 
can penetrate perceptual experience. But for reasons explained in §4, in the case of imaginative 
penetration, the penetrated experience is rendered non-assertoric. 
Consider a relatively simple example of belief-penetration adduced by Siegel (2012, 202). 
Jill believes that Jack is angry at her, and this belief generates a visual experience of Jack as 
being angry. In this case, a belief penetrates an experience to the effect that the experience has 
content that reflects the content of the penetrating belief. Suppose, however, that Jill does not 
believe that Jack is angry at her, but decides to imagine that Jack is angry at her. We maintain 
that this imagining can also penetrate Jill’s visual experience to the effect that it represents Jack 
 
5 See also Van Leeuwen (2013, 222). Similarly, Macpherson (2012) adduces examples of 
assertoric perceptual experiences that she claims are penetrated by mental images. 
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as being angry. In this case, Jill veridically and assertorically visually experiences Jack’s face as 
having certain properties, and also believes that it has those properties. But Jill does not believe, 
nor is she inclined to believe, that Jack is angry: she imagines that Jack is angry, and 
consequently, visually experiences him, non-veridically and non-assertorically, as being angry. 
Her imagining, we argue, functions just as the belief that Jack is angry functions in Siegel’s 
example; it prompts a top-down modulation of her experience, to the effect that Jill experiences 
Jack as being angry. Being penetrated by her imagining, Jill’s experience of Jack as angry is part 
of an imaginative trip, and hence, non-assertoric. 
In his account of visual fictions, Walton defends the thesis that propositional imaginings can 
penetrate perceptual experience (1990; 2008). To see how Walton’s idea can account for non-
assertoricity, we will focus on the sort of experiences he tries to explain. Consider the following 
case: 
 
Case C: Watching a play, Anna, by virtue of having certain visual experiences, imagines the 
play’s content. Some of her perceptual experiences are veridical, e.g., she experiences 
people walking, hears them talking, etc. Some, however, are non-veridical, e.g., she 
experiences people as being angry, she experiences the firing of a gun, someone bleeding, a 
couple embracing as the sun sets over the sea behind them. 
 
Anna’s non-veridical perceptual experiences are, to a great extent, non-assertoric: Anna is 
hardly inclined to believe that the people on the stage are really angry, that a (real) gun was fired, 
that the pooling red liquid is blood, that the colorful backdrop is a sunset. Certain (non-veridical) 
experiences may, perhaps, incline Anna, to some degree, to believe their content: she may 
17 
 
occasionally be inclined to believe that one actor is indeed angry at another actor, or, in light of 
remarkable special effects, that the backdrop of breaking waves is not cardboard scenery, but 
actual water. But such inclinations are not generated by every non-veridical experience Anna has 
in watching the play. Were Anna inclined to believe the content of her experiences, as she is 
inclined to believe the content of similar experiences in non-fictional contexts, her overall 
doxastic state would be completely different. Compare Anna’s doxastic state to that of a 
spectator who, utterly immersed in the play, starts to worry that the people on stage are livid, a 
real gun was fired, the victim is actually bleeding, etc. Experiencing the same content that Anna 
experiences, this spectator repeatedly suspects that something bad is happening on stage, and is 
disposed to act accordingly (to scream, seek help, call 911, etc.). Anna, by contrast, is enjoying 
the play, and to a great extent, disinclined to believe the content of her non-veridical 
experiences.6 
What renders Anna’s non-veridical experiences non-assertoric? What distinguishes between, 
say, her assertoric (veridical) experience of someone’s face, and her non-assertoric (non-
veridical) experience of someone’s being angry? The answer seems to pivot on the fact that 
Anna’s experiences arise in the context of watching a play and imagining the play’s content. But 
how, exactly, do her imaginings impact her experiences? 
 
6 Anna may well be moved by the play, just as anyone who reads a work of fiction may be 
moved by the imaginings aroused by engagement with that work. However, emotional responses 
to works of fiction are generally explained by the fact that one imagines their content (see the 
references in note 3). To our knowledge, nowhere in the literature is it argued that emotional 
responses to fiction are generated by an inclination to believe the fictional content. 
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Walton’s account addresses the last question. It argues that the (non-veridical) perceptual 
experiences we ordinarily have in watching movies, looking at pictures, etc., are penetrated by 
propositional imaginings just as ordinary perceptual experiences are penetrated by beliefs. 
Regarding the visual experiences we ordinarily have in looking at a picture, Walton maintains 
that “cognitive states of many sorts—beliefs, thoughts … —enter into our perceptual 
experiences”; in particular, “imaginings … enter into visual experiences. … The imaginings 
called for when one looks at a picture inform the experience of looking at it” (Walton 1990, 
295ff).7 Walton’s account of visual fictions is more complicated than his general account of 
fiction. Walton argues that works of fiction serve as props in a game of make-believe: a work 
counts as fiction just in case it mandates its audience to imagine its content (Walton 1990, 72ff). 
In reading a novel, for instance, we first grasp its content—what it asks us to imagine—then 
respond by imagining that content. When engaging with visual fictions (or more broadly, 
“depictive representations”; 1990, ch. 8), however, we do not first visually experience all the 
content that we are mandated to imagine at a given moment in the play, and then imagine it. 
Rather, Walton argues, in such cases, some imaginings arise before the pertinent visual 
experiences, imparting them with new content. 
 
7 For further comparison of belief-penetration and imaginative-penetration, see Walton (2008, 
138ff). Walton uses the term “imagining seeing” to describe the overall mental state wherein 
imaginings penetrate visual experience. Yet he maintains that the state is not imagining, but a 
visual experience that is colored by one’s imaginings: the seeing and the imagining become “a 
single complex phenomenological whole” (1990, 295); see also the analysis of Walton’s account 
in Chasid (2016, 28ff). 
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As Chasid (2016, 30ff) points out, Walton does not detail which imaginings penetrate, and 
hence arise prior to, the perceptual experience of objects or events depicted by a visual work of 
fiction (e.g., the visual experience of a picture’s depictum; perceptual experiences of objects, 
properties, and events depicted by a play), and which imaginings arise after those experiences. 
This lacuna in Walton’s account can be filled in various ways. Perhaps the spectator’s 
expectations or knowledge about the depicted events and objects prompt her to imagine certain 
propositions (e.g., that someone is angry, that the sun is setting, etc.); these imaginings then 
penetrate her experience to the effect that she visually experiences those propositions. Or 
perhaps, in looking at a picture or watching a play, the perceiving subject veridically and 
assertorically experiences certain combinations of low-level properties (colors, shapes, etc.), and 
this experience of low-level properties prompts her to imagine that the things she is looking at 
have certain high-level properties (being a sunset; being angry)—properties that the subject does 
not believe those things really have. This imagining then penetrates her perceptual experience to 
the effect that the experience represents those high-level properties.8 
One way or another, some experiences that arise in watching (looking at) visual fictions, 
Walton claims, are penetrated by imaginings. We contend, on the basis of Walton’s thesis, that 
 
8 Chasid (2016, §4) makes a similar argument, asserting that imaginings can function like beliefs 
that are associated with recognizing high-level properties. In watching a play or looking at a 
picture, the spectator believes that she is looking at actors or at a picture’s marked surface, but 
processes these stimuli through imaginings that have the same content as her recognitional 
beliefs. (Chasid invokes the widely-accepted claim that in general, imaginings can have the same 
content as beliefs.) I.e., the spectator’s experience has the same top-down modulation that 
experiences have in non-imaginative contexts, except that imaginings replace beliefs. 
20 
 
Anna’s non-veridical experiences are non-assertoric because they are penetrated by imaginings. 
Not being totally immersed in the performance, Anna visually experiences angry faces, a 
bleeding victim, a sunset over the sea, etc., without being inclined by these experiences to 
believe that anyone on stage is angry or bleeding, or that the sun is setting. Returning to A3 and 
B3, their non-assertoricity can also be accounted for by imaginative penetration. The main 
difference between Anna’s non-veridical experiences and A3 (B3) is that Anna’s experiences 
arise in the context of engaging with fiction, whereas they do not. This difference, however, is 
superficial. Whether a subject intends to imagine, imagines by following ‘instructions,’ or 
imagines spontaneously, her imaginings, we contend, can render her perceptual experience non-
assertoric. 
When John, e.g., realizes that the spot is on the mirror, he decides to pretend that he 
observes the spot as being on his nose, and proceeds to imagine that the spot is indeed on his 
nose. By top-down modulation that incorporates imaginings, John experiences the spot as being 
on his nose. The same is true of the other garden-variety cases, whether the subject’s imaginings 
arise spontaneously or intentionally. Maggie (on the second scenario) imagines that the person 
she sees is Jim, hence her experience of Jim’s stealing a book does not incline her to believe that 
Jim is stealing a book. Similarly, when John decides to imagine himself gazing at a doppelgänger 
(by looking in the mirror), he experiences his doppelgänger non-assertorically. And when Jill 
imagines (without believing) that Jack is angry at her, a top-down modulation occurs—a 
modulation structurally similar to the modulation in Siegel’s example—to the effect that she 
experiences Jack as being angry, though this experience doesn’t incline her to believe that he 
really is angry. 
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Since belief-like imaginings arise not only in the context of reading or watching fiction, but 
also in quotidian contexts, intentionally or spontaneously, non-assertoric perceptual experiences 
can also arise, intentionally or spontaneously, in such contexts. To reiterate, the argument we are 
making is that, given that beliefs can penetrate perceptual experience, belief-like imaginings can, 
to a great extent, do so too. Our starting point was the fact that sometimes we are not inclined to 
believe the content of our perceptual experiences, or are inclined to believe that content only 
slightly. The slightness or total absence of an inclination to believe cannot be attributed to 
sensory input, which can be identical in cases where we are inclined to believe the content of 
perceptual experiences, and cases where we are not. Nor can it be attributed to defeating 
evidence, which, we showed, is insufficient to thwart the putative inclination to believe the 
content of perceptual experiences. We have suggested that it be accounted for in terms of 
imaginative penetration. Due to being penetrated by belief-like imaginings, perceptual 
experiences that take place in the context of imagining either do not induce the perceiver to 
believe their content, or induce her to believe that content to a far smaller degree than would 
similar experiences where no relevant imaginings arise. 
 
4. Imaginings and Non-Assertoricity 
 
Why do belief-like imaginings have the power to block or substantially reduce perceptual 
assertoricity? To answer this question, it is tempting to adduce the fact that imaginings 
themselves are non-assertoric states: they do not ordinarily incline the imaginer to believe their 
content. Since imaginings are non-assertoric, the seemingly straightforward answer is that, to the 
extent that imaginings influence perceptual experience as we described above, they do so by 
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neutralizing a perceptual experience’s ‘implied assertion operator,’ so that the experiencer is not 
inclined to believe what the experience tells her about the world. 
This explanation, however, is insufficient, since other kinds of non-assertoric states 
penetrate perceptual experience without rendering it non-assertoric. Desires, for instance, are 
non-assertoric states, yet they can penetrate perceptual experience without reducing its 
assertoricity (see, e.g., Stokes 2012, on hunger and “background desires”). A desire for rain may 
penetrate one’s visual experience to the effect that one has an assertoric experience of rain. But 
if, as the example of desires shows, the penetrating state’s non-assertoricity is not what renders a 
perceptual experience non-assertoric, what feature do imaginings have that enables them to 
thwart, or significantly reduce, the putative inclination to believe? 
The answer is that imaginings are non-assertoric because they are not ‘directed’ at the real 
world; they do not purport to represent that which is true simpliciter (i.e., in the real world), but 
that which is true in an imaginary world. When Jill, for instance, imagines that Jack is angry at 
her, she does not take the imagined proposition to be true simpliciter, but to be true in the 
imaginary world, the world of her imaginative episode. Jill is therefore not inclined by her 
imagining to believe the proposition that Jack is angry at her, because in imagining that 
proposition, she is only taking it to be true in an unreal, imaginary world. Our point is that a 
perceptual experience that is penetrated by imaginings (Jill’s visual experience of Jack’s being 
angry) likewise does not generate an inclination to believe its content, since it too is directed at 
an imaginary world (henceforth: i-world): it is not meant to represent that which is true 
simpliciter, but that which is true in the world of the imaginative episode. 
The idea that imaginings do not pertain to the real world is discussed in Walton (1990; 2015, 
ch. 2). Walton characterizes fictional (or imaginary) worlds in terms of works of fiction, 
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claiming that they are “sets of propositions-as-indicated-by-a-given-work” (1990, 67). Anna’s 
imaginings (case C), for instance, pertain to the play’s world—the set of propositions depicted by 
the play. Imaginative episodes can, of course, arise not only in response to reading or watching 
works of fiction, but also in daydreaming, pretending, playing games of make-believe, etc. In 
such cases, the i-world is identified with the set of propositions assumed to be true by the 
subject, intentionally or spontaneously, when she engages in imagining. In the world of Jill’s 
imaginative episode, e.g., it is true that Jack is angry at her. Imaginary worlds are relatively 
indeterminate: the world of Jill’s imaginative episode, e.g., may be comprised of very few 
propositions, one of which is that Jack is angry at her. (Henceforth we use the general term 
‘imaginary world’ (‘i-world’) rather than the term ‘fictional world,’ since the latter term is often 
reserved for contexts involving responses to works of fiction). 
It should be noted that i-worlds may incorporate propositions that are true simpliciter, and 
propositions that refer to real objects: in the world of Jill’s imaginings, it is (the real) Jack who is 
angry, and both Jill and Jack have some of their real-world properties. Yet given that in the i-
world, Jack is angry at Jill, this world differs from the real world, being constituted by different 
truths. When, by way of imagining, the proposition that Jack is angry at Jill is accepted as true, 
this imagining penetrates Jill’s visual experience to the effect that her experience represents Jack 
as being angry. Her experience, like the imagining that has penetrated it, reflects what is true in 
the i-world, and hence does not incline Jill to believe that Jack is really angry at her. 
This applies to B3 and the other garden-variety imaginings discussed above. John’s 
imagining that he has a spot on his nose purports to represent what is true in an i-world. B3 thus 
pertains to that world: it does not reflect truth simpliciter, hence it does not incline John to 
believe that he has a spot on his nose. A3, the doppelgänger experience, the ‘Jim-like book thief’ 
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experience (construed as per the second scenario), and similar experiences are explained the 
same way. Being shaped by imaginings, imaginatively-penetrated experiences do not purport to 
inform the perceiving subject about the real world, and therefore do not incline her to believe 
their content. In this respect, imaginings differ from desires, hopes, and other non-assertoric 
states, since in themselves, imaginings do not purport to represent the real world, either as it is, 
or as one would like it to be. 
What still needs to be explained is how the proposed account applies to the refined thesis 
discussed above, namely, the thesis that B3 inclines John to believe its content only slightly or 
non-consciously. The problem is that if belief-like imaginings do not purport to represent what 
the real world is like, the perceptual experiences they penetrate should not generate any 
inclination, however slight, to believe their content. That is, if imaginatively-penetrated 
experiences do not purport to inform us about the real world, how can they incline imaginers to 
believe—even only slightly or non-consciously—that their content obtains in the real world? 
B3’s degree of assertoricity, on our explanation, should be zero, whereas according to the refined 
thesis, B3 may be slightly assertoric. 
This problem can be solved by recognizing that imaginings, despite being directed at an 
unreal world, sometimes generate a slight inclination to believe their content. Whatever the 
explanation for this phenomenon, it is a matter of everyday experience that, even if we are fully 
aware that we are imagining, and direct our mental states at some i-world, we sometimes find 
ourselves wondering whether what we are imagining is also true simpliciter. This phenomenon 
can occur in watching or reading fiction, modal reasoning, daydreaming, pretending, and any 
other context in which imaginings arise. Suppose you imagine, or take it to be true in the 
pertinent i-world (a movie’s fictional world, the world of a daydream, a game of make-believe, 
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etc.), that human-like aliens live among us, that Elvis is alive, that a monster lives in a nearby 
lake, etc. Though aware that you are imagining, you might start to wonder whether the imagined 
propositions are true simpliciter: your imaginings might generate a slight inclination to believe 
that aliens live among us, Elvis is alive, etc. This scenario is certainly conceivable: for reasons 
that warrant a separate discussion, you may wonder, at least for a moment, whether the 
propositions you take to be true in the i-world are also true simpliciter. The refined thesis can be 
understood along these lines. This does not, however, detract from our main point: imaginings 
are able to reduce, if not completely block, the assertoricity of the perceptual experiences they 
penetrate, by rendering these experiences directed at the world of the imaginative interlude. 
Another objection might be that sometimes imaginings are assertoric, and do purport to 
provide information about the (real) world. Consider cases of extreme imaginative immersion. 
Suppose that a subject, being totally immersed in her imaginings, takes their content so seriously 
that, to the extent that they penetrate her perceptual experience, they do not block its assertoric 
force. As we mentioned apropos case C, a spectator could be so raptly immersed in the play she 
is watching that she experiences its content—a shooting, a bleeding victim, a sunset on the 
beach—assertorically. Although being immersed to that degree would seem to amount to 
believing,9 let us suppose that such cases indeed involve assertoric imaginings, not beliefs. This 
is compatible with our account, since as just explained, belief-like imaginings may sometimes 
induce the imaginer to consider the veracity of their content. The paper’s focus, however, is non-
assertoric perceptual experiences, and its goal is to account for non-assertoricity in terms of 
 
9 Schellenberg (2013) argues that if the subject is sufficiently immersed in her imaginings, they 
“become” beliefs, since imaginings and beliefs exist on a continuum. Cf. Liao and Doggett 
(2014) and Chasid (2017, §5). 
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imaginings. For this purpose, it suffices to assume that commonplace imaginings (i.e., not the 
‘extreme’ imaginings of total imaginative immersion), are non-assertoric. We contend that these 
non-assertoric imaginings penetrate perceptual experiences, rendering them non-assertoric. In 
cases A, B, and C, the imaginings that shape the non-assertoric experiences are themselves non-
assertoric, that is, they are not the sort of imaginings adduced by opponents of our account as 
counterexamples. Moreover, given that we are not ordinarily inclined by our imaginings to 
believe their content—we ordinarily remain aware that they reflect the truth in an imaginary 
world—the phenomena that require further explanation are imaginative immersion and other 
cases where our imaginings incline us to believe their content. 
This point also explains why our account is compatible with another type of alleged 
assertoricity associated with imaginings. It might be argued that, since we sometimes gain 
knowledge (i.e., knowledge about the real world) through imagining, imaginings are, in an 
important sense, assertoric with respect to the real-world truths that we learn from them.10 Yet it 
is not necessarily the case that we learn from imagining, and even when we do, this does not 
entail that the primary role of imaginings is to impart that which is true simpliciter. Here, too, 
what requires explanation is the fact that we sometimes do learn from imaginings. Our claim in 
this paper is that since Mary’s and John’s belief-like imaginings do not purport to impart 
knowledge of the real world, the perceptual experiences penetrated by these imaginings do not 
incline Mary and John to believe that the content of these experiences is true in the real world; 
penetration by imaginings renders them non-assertoric. 
 
10 Whether it is possible to learn from imagining is much debated; see Kind and Kung (2016). To 




The limited scope of our explanation should be emphasized. We do not claim that non-
assertoric perceptual experience is always explained by imaginative penetration. Imaginings can 
thwart or reduce perceptual assertoricity, but perhaps there are other factors that can also have 
that effect. Each case of perceptual non-assertoricity should be examined separately, to see 
whether it incorporates imaginings, and whether they are indeed thwarting assertoricity. 
Consider, e.g., the experience of a stick partly submerged in water, which represents the stick as 
bent. What explains the fact that, ordinarily, we are not inclined by this experience to believe that 
the stick is bent? Does robust defeating evidence, or familiarity with this illusion, suffice to 
thwart perceptual assertoricity? Perhaps, though as we saw, these factors don’t suffice to thwart 
assertoricity in other cases. Indeed, in the case of the stick, too, these factors do not completely 
thwart assertoricity. For if we focus on the submerged part of the stick, and try to ascertain its 
precise location, our visual experience may have assertoric force with respect to that part of the 
stick: as hard as we try to ignore our experience of the submerged part’s specific location 
(knowing that our experience of the stick is non-veridical), it may mislead us. Hence our 
experience of the submerged part’s location may have assertoric force that is thwarted neither by 
familiarity and defeating evidence, nor by imaginings. What about the non-assertoricity of our 
experience of the stick as having the high-level property of being bent? As we saw in the case of 
visual fictions, imaginings can sometimes explain the non-assertoricity of high-level properties. 
Perhaps our awareness of the illusion prompts us to imagine that the stick is bent; this imagining 
then penetrates our experience, to the effect that it represents the high-level property of bentness, 
rendering this experience non-assertoric. 
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This explanation raises several concerns, one of which is whether imaginings can arise 
without much awareness. These concerns, as well as the idea that the failure of perceptual 




We started out by describing perceptual assertoricity, then adduced cases where perceptual 
experience is non-assertoric, i.e., does not incline the subject to believe its content. After 
showing why certain experiences are best described as not, or only slightly, inclining the 
perceiving subject to believe their content, we accounted for the failure of full assertoricity by 
invoking belief-like imaginings. We argued that, just as beliefs can penetrate perceptual 
experience, belief-like (propositional; attitudinal) imaginings can likewise penetrate perceptual 
experience. When perceptual experience is penetrated by imaginings rather than beliefs, it does 
not incline the subject to believe its content, since like imaginings, imaginatively-penetrated 
experience does not purport to represent truths simpliciter, but only truths of the pertinent 
imaginary world. 
Several issues related to the scope of imaginative penetration and non-assertoric experiences 
require further examination. First, although we addressed falsidical experiences, it seems 
plausible that experiences whose content is true can also be rendered non-assertoric by 
imaginings. Recall the Perky experiment, whose subjects were not inclined to believe that there 
was a yellow object in front of them, a result interpreted as ensuing from the fact that the 
subjects believed that they were visualizing a yellow object. However, since defeating beliefs—
in this case, the belief that one is visualizing and not perceiving—do not suffice to block 
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assertoricity, there may be a better explanation for the non-assertoricity of the experiences Perky 
described. We suggest that these experiences were penetrated by belief-like imaginings: 
believing that they were visualizing, the participants imagined that there was a banana in front of 
them. This belief-like imagining influenced their experiential state, rendering it directed at an 
imaginary world; as such, it did not purport to represent truths simpliciter, and was thus non-
assertoric. 
Another question pertains to the scope of the similarity between imaginings and beliefs. 
Recall that our argument is partly motivated by the fact that imaginings tend to ‘mimic’ beliefs in 
functional respects. On the basis of this general similarity, we argued that if beliefs can influence 
experience, belief-like imaginings can do so as well. The functional similarity between beliefs 
and imaginings is, however, far from total.11 It is obviously not true that, if we replace a belief 
with an imagining that has the same content, we get the same relations to other mental states. A 
specific point that remains to be explored is the extent to which imaginings are similar to beliefs 
with respect to penetrating perceptual experience. 
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